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Abstract
In this paper we computationally examine how subjec-
tive experience may help or harm the decision maker’s
learning under uncertain outcomes, frames and their in-
teractions. To model subjective experience, we propose
the “experienced-utility function” based on a prospect
theory (PT)-based parameterized subjective value func-
tion. Our analysis and simulations of two-armed bandit
tasks present that the task domain (underlying outcome
distributions) and framing (reference point selection)
influence experienced utilities and in turn, the “subjec-
tive discriminability” of choices under uncertainty. Ex-
periments demonstrate that subjective discriminability
improves on objective discriminability by the use of the
experienced-utility function with appropriate framing
for a given task domain, and that bigger subjective dis-
criminability leads to more optimal decisions in learn-
ing under uncertainty.
Introduction
There are two seemingly contradictory experimental results
regarding the role of subjective experience in human learn-
ing and decisions under uncertainty: Iowa gambling exper-
iment (Bechara and Damasio 2005; Bechara et al. 1997;
Naqvi, Shiv, and Bechara 2006; Yechiam et al. 2005) and
Shiv et al.’s experiment (Shiv et al. 2005). Essentially both
experiments can be thought of as two-armed bandit tasks
involving choices between two options with different uncer-
tain outcome distributions. In these tasks, the decision maker
should regulate the balance between exploration (choices to
find new information) and exploitation (choices to maximize
outcome with current information) in order to maximize the
overall outcome for total trials (Sutton and Barto 1998).
First, Iowa gambling task in which choices are made be-
tween one option with higher mean and less uncertain out-
comes (option 1) vs. the other option with lower mean and
more uncertain outcomes (option 2) (e.g., Domain 1 in Fig-
ure 1) has shown that normal people are good at quickly
selecting the long-run advantageous option (optimal option
= option 1) in this type of task, whereas patients with emo-
tional deficits related with the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (vmPFC) damage are not (Bechara and Damasio 2005;
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Bechara et al. 1997; Naqvi, Shiv, and Bechara 2006). For
Iowa gambling tasks, it should be noted that the optimal op-
tion involved safer gain outcomes, whereas the suboptimal
option involved risky outcomes with long-run expected loss.
Second, Shiv et al.’s experiment (Shiv et al. 2005) in
which choices are made between the option with higher
mean and more uncertain outcomes (option 1) vs. the op-
tion with lower mean and less uncertain outcomes (option
2) (e.g., Domain 2 in Figure 1) has presented the harmful
side of subjective emotional learning in terms of optimal de-
cision behavior 1. In Shiv et al.s actual experiment, the task
involved 20 rounds of investment decisions between the op-
timal option with risky outcomes (investment, $3.5 gain with
50% chance and $1 loss with 50% chance for a choice, ex-
pected return = $1.25) and the safer suboptimal option (no
investment, $1 gain for sure each choice, expected return =
$1). Here also, normal people tended to select the option
involving safer gain outcomes (but suboptimal in this task)
more often than patients with emotional deficits.
In this paper we computationally explain how and when
subjective experience (subjective discriminability) can lead
to more or less optimal learning than objective experience
in view of the interaction of framing and task domain. Our
work contributes a novel unified framework that explains
both the Iowa experiment, Shiv et al’s experiment, and a va-
riety of decision making tasks in this perspective.
In our view, both Iowa and Shiv et al’s experiments il-
lustrate that normal people tend to have uncertainty-averse
and loss-averse attitude when they are faced with potential
consistent gains. Furthermore, the task domain (underlying
outcome distributions), interacting with the given gain frame
is one factor that determines whether people’s subjective ex-
perience and uncertainty aversion help or harm their optimal
decision making and learning under uncertainty.
We propose that, provided the decision maker’s represen-
tative risk attitude in each frame (gain or loss frame), the
role of subjective experience-based learning depends on the
task domain, the frame (reference point 2) selected by the
1The outcome distributions actually involved in IOWA and
Shiv’s experiments were not Gaussian. However, Domain 1 and
Domain 2 in Figure 1 represent the essential characteristics of those
distributions in a mathematically simple way.
2If the decision maker’s own reference point for evaluating out-
comes is smaller (or greater) than most sampled outcomes; thus,
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(a) Domain 1 (b) Domain 2
Figure 1: Domains under uncertainty
decision maker themselves, and their interaction.
We investigate how domains and frames influence subjec-
tive experience and in turn, the “subjective discriminability”
of choices. The concept of discriminability (Thurstone 1927;
Busemeyer and Townsend 1993) characterizes the level of
easiness in figuring out which option is optimal with fewer
trials; thus, the discriminability is a key factor in regulat-
ing the trade-offs between exploration and exploitation and
quickly detecting the optimal decision in learning. To model
subjective experience, we propose the “experienced-utility
function” based on a prospect theory (PT)-based parame-
terized subjective value function (Figure 2) (Kahneman and
Tversky 1984; Kahneman 2003).
Using two-armed bandit task simulations, we com-
pare subjective discriminability from the experienced-utility
function (utility = PT-based subjective value) with objective
discriminability from the linear utility function (utility = out-
come). We also compare them using 10-armed badit tasks.
We find computationally that subjective discriminability can
be increased by the use of the experienced-utility function
with appropriate framing for a domain, and that bigger sub-
jective discriminability leads to more optimal decisions.
Background and Related Work
Kahneman’s utility taxonomy is useful for distinguishing
multiple concepts of utility (Kahneman 2000). First, in mod-
ern economics, utility is inferred from observed choices and
in turn used to explain choices. This behavioral and motiva-
tional concept of utility is called “decision utility.” Second,
“experienced utility” refers to the experiences of pleasure
and pain, as Bentham used it (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin
1997). It is the affective or hedonic impact of an obtained
outcome after a choice. Kahneman distinguished experi-
enced utility from decision utility. Recent findings in neu-
roscience suggest that the neural substrates of liking (expe-
rienced utility) are separate from those of wanting (decision
utility) in the human brain (Berridge and Robinson 2003;
Berridge and Aldridge 2006). Third, “predicted utility” is a
belief about the future experienced utility of a choice before
making a decision.
The role of subjective prediction in one-shot decision
making under risk 3 has been extensively examined in
those outcomes are evaluated as gains (or losses), then, the frame
is called gain frame (or loss frame, respectively).
3In the decision-making literature (Glimcher and Rustichini
2004; Barron and Erev 2003), decisions under “risk” (when out-






v = fPT(x− xref ) =
{
(x− xref )a , x− xref ≥ 0
−λ(xref − x)b , x− xref < 0
0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1, λ > 1
Figure 2: Prospect Theory (PT) Subjective Value Function
prospect theory (PT) (Kahneman 2003; Tversky and Kah-
neman 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 1984). In de-
cisions under risk, the main determinant of decisions is the
decision maker’s predicted utility (i.e., decision utility = pre-
dicted utility). PT employs a subjective value function (Fig-
ure 2) called the “predicted-utility function” by which the
decision maker’s risk attitudes and framing in prediction and
decision can be described. Yet, the role of subjective expe-
rience in decisions under uncertainty has less been investi-
gated. For decisions under uncertainty, the overall experi-
ence of the decision maker on previous trials in the same
situation has a critical impact on future decisions. Thus, to-
tal experienced utility from the overall past experience crit-
ically influences current decision utility (decision utility '
total-experienced utility).
Prospect Theory and Subjective Value Function
The PT subjective value function in Figure 2 has three es-
sential characteristics: First, gains and losses are defined rel-
ative to a reference point (reference dependence). If an ex-
pected outcome x is greater or smaller than a reference point
xref , relative outcome x− xref is viewed as a gain or a loss,
respectively. The reference point may depend on framing
(the way the task is designed and described) and the deci-
sion maker’s expected outcome over relevant options. Sec-
ond, the function has diminishing sensitivity: it is concave
in the area of gains (0 < a < 1, denoting risk-averse atti-
tude when faced with likely gains) and convex in the area of
losses (0 < b < 1, denoting risk-seeking attitude when faced
with likely losses). Third, the function is steeper in the area
of losses (λ > 1, denoting loss aversion). 4 Note that, while
PT uses the subjective value function to model “predicted-
utility function”, we propose and test a PT-based parame-
terized subjective value function to model the “experienced-
utility function.” We assume that the two functions are inde-
pendent of and separate from each other.
known to the decision maker) are often distinguished from deci-
sions under “uncertainty” (when outcome probabilities of each op-
tion are not explicitly described and should be learned from expe-
riences).
4We define the value of risk (VOR) for an outcome distribu-
tion as the difference between the subjective value of the outcome
distribution (X) and that of its certainty-equivalent (µx): VOR =
f(X) − f(µx) where f is the decision maker’s subjective value
function. Note that the value of f(X) depends not only on µx and
σ2x but also on the risk attitude (a,b,λ, xref ): VOR < 0 (risk aver-
sion) if 0 < a < 1 in gain frame or b > 1 in loss frame; VOR > 0
(risk seeking) if a > 1 in gain frame or 0 < b < 1 in loss frame.
Experience-based Mode and Total-Experienced
Utility
Past emotional experiences associated with a candidate op-
tion in similar situations to the current state are auto-
matically retrieved from episodic memory and reactivated
in short-term memory (Bechara et al. 1997; Niedenthal
2007). This overall reactivation, called the “experience-
based mode” in our model, contributes to the motivation of
selecting the option. The experience-based mode is approxi-
mated by a model-free caching reinforcement learning (RL)
algorithm (Sutton and Barto 1998), which can be related
to Kahneman’s moment-based approach. According to Kah-
neman (Kahneman 2000), “total-experienced utility” (a.k.a.
“total utility”) is a statistically aggregated overall value over
past experienced utilities. Total-experienced utility (or the
experience-based mode) explains the role of past experi-
ences in the computation of decision utility. 5
Discriminability
The concept of discriminability has been largely investigated
under different names in a variety of areas such as psy-
chophysical judgment and decision theory (Thurstone 1927;
Holland 1975; Busemeyer and Townsend 1993), pattern
classification (Duda, Hart, and Stork 2001), signal detection
theory (called the “sensitivity index” or d′) (Wickens 2002)
and statistical power analysis (called the “effect size”) (Co-
hen 1992). Discriminability can be used for characterizing
the level of easiness for a task in discriminating which op-
tion is optimal with a given number of trials. Thus, as dis-
criminability for a task becomes larger, this means that it is
easier for the decision maker to tell which option is better
than others in terms of average outcome.
Decisions under Uncertainty and Frames
We compare objective discriminability with subjective dis-
criminability in two-armed bandit problems with station-
ary distributions of stochastic outcomes, and show that sub-
jective discriminability can be increased by the use of the
experienced-utility function with appropriate framing for a
task domain.
Two-armed Bandit Tasks
Consider a two-armed bandit task in which each option k
(=1, 2) is associated with a unknown normal (Gaussian) out-
come distribution r ∼ N(µk, σ2k) (assuming µ1 > µ2). Note
that, in this paper, option 1 always denotes the optimal op-
tion, whereas option 2 is suboptimal. The goal of the deci-
sion maker is to maximize the total outcome duringN trials.
For the simplicity of explanation, we consider a decision-
making strategy in which the decision maker clearly distin-
guishes initial 2nB exploratory trials from later N − 2nB
trials (assuming 2nB < N ). Also, it is assumed that dur-
ing the exploratory trials, the decision maker alternatively
5Total-experienced utility could be also associated with “action
value” in model-free RL and “anticipatory emotion” in the decision
making literature (Bechara and Damasio 2005; Cohen, Pham, and
Andrade 2006; Loewenstein and Lerner 2003; Pham 2007).
selects one of the options; thus, after these trials, random
outcomes of nB trials for each option will be obtained.
Objective Discriminability
To define a concept of discriminability associated with the
initial 2nB-trial exploration, we focus on the trial tB(=
2nB + 1) immediately after 2nB exploratory trials. On
this trial the average outcome (sample mean) of nB ob-
served outcomes after nB exploratory trials of each op-







where r(i)k is the ith sampled outcome of option k. Also,









) for each k. Denote the option selected
on trial tB by atB . Assuming that the decision maker se-
lects the option with higher average objective outcome, the
expected frequency rate of choosing option 1 over option
2 on trial tB in a large number of tasks is Probj(atB =
1) = Pr(µˆtB1 > µˆ
tB
2 ) = Pr(µˆ
tB
1 − µˆtB2 > 0) = Pr(y >
0) where y ∆= µˆtB1 − µˆtB2 . Since µˆtB1 and µˆtB2 are nor-
mal variables, y is also a normal variable following y ∼
N(µ1 − µ2, (σ21 + σ22)/nB). Now the standard normal vari-




∼ N(0, 1) whose cumulative dis-
tribution function (cdf) is Φ(x) = 12
(





to Pr(y > 0) = Pr(z > −dB) = 1 − Φ(−dB) = Φ(dB)





















obj). Note that d
′
obj depends
only on the statistics of objective outcome distributions
given in the problem and that as d′obj of the underlying do-
main increases, the objective decision maker’s expected fre-
quency rate of choosing option 1 over option 2 after 2nB
exploratory trials becomes close to 1.
Subjective Discriminability
Now consider what happens to the discriminability when the
decision maker employs the subjective value (experienced-
utility) function. Given the experienced-utility function
fEU , the average subjective value of option k after nB ex-









k = fEU (r
(i)
k ). When
we approximate the distributions of the subjective-value









) for option k(= 1, 2).
Assuming that the decision maker selects the option with
higher average subjective value, the probability (i.e., ex-
pected frequency rate) of choosing option 1 over option 2














d′subj depends not only on the underlying outcome distri-
butions, but also on the experienced-utility function whose
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Figure 4: Discriminabilities vs. reference point, showing how the reference point selection influences d′subj : (a) Domain 1; (b)
Domain 2; (c) Domain with equal uncertainty. Green lines indicate example reference points to explain framing effects.
shape and reference point are described by the parameters.
As d′subj increases, the subjective decision maker’s expected
frequency rate of choosing option 1 over option 2 after 2nB
exploratory trials becomes close to 1.
Comparison between Objective and Subjective
Discriminabilities
The decision maker’s expected frequency rate of choosing
option 1 over option 2 after nB trials of each option de-












Therefore, if subjective discriminability d′subj is greater than
objective discriminability d′obj for a decision maker with
appropriate shape and reference point of the experienced-
utility function, subjective decision making can provide a
better overall performance due to a higher probability of
choosing option 1 over option 2 on remaining trials. In other
words, to reach a pre-specified probability of selecting the
optimal option, a subjective decision making with a larger
d′subj should require fewer exploratory trials than objec-
tive decision making with a smaller d′obj . Note that d
′
obj
relies only on the true means and standard deviations of
underlying outcome distributions (µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2), whereas
d′subj (or µsubj,1, µsubj,2, σsubj,1, σsubj,2) depends on sub-
jective value function shape parameters and reference point
a, b, λ, xref as well as µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2.
Given a representative subjective value function
(experienced-utility function) shape and a reference
point selection for example, Figure 3 shows how the
objective and subjective discriminabilities can be defined
if the underlying outcome distributions were known. Here,
subjective value distributions are the transformation of
objective outcome distributions through the function. Here
we use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the true means
(µsubj,k) and standard deviations (σsubj,k) of the subjective
value distributions (vk = fEU (rk) for k = 1, 2) obtained
by shaping the original objective outcome distributions
(rk ∼ N(µk, σ2k)) through the subjective value function
fEU (·).
The Influence of Domain and Framing on the
Subjective Discriminability
Subplots (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 4 show the simulation
results on how the reference point selection (framing) influ-
ences subjective discriminability on different domains (Do-
main 1, Domain 2, and a domain where two options have
equal uncertainty in outcomes) for a decision maker employ-
ing a subjective value function (experienced-utility (EU))
function with shape parameters a = 0.8, b = 0.5, λ = 2.5 6.
6From our sensitivity tests of parameters, we can obtain the
same characteristics of domain-frame interaction effects when 0 <
Note that these three domains can represent all possible
cases of stationary gaussian outcome distributions in two-
armed bandit problems. It should be noted that d′subj sig-
nificantly changes as the reference point selection changes,
while d′obj does not depend on the reference point.
On Domain 1 (Figure 4 (a)), option 1 (µ1 = 5 and σ1
= 5) is optimal with less uncertainty, while option 2 (µ1
= -5 and σ1 = 10) is suboptimal with more uncertainty. In
this domain, the gain frame (−10 < xref < 2.5) leads
to an increased subjective discriminability (d′subj > d
′
obj),
whereas the loss frame (xref > 2.5) leads to a decreased




the characteristic of the experienced-utility function, the de-
cision maker’s subjective experience in the gain frame (e.g.,
xref = −5, green line) would mainly elicit the uncertainty-
averse and loss-averse attitude (0 < a < 1, λ > 1) tend-
ing to prefer the option 1 that generates more certain gains
and avoid the option 2 that generates big losses very often.
The loss frame (e.g., xref = 10, green line) would mainly
bring out the uncertainty-seeking and loss-averse attitude
(0 < b < 1, λ > 1) tending to prefer the option 2 that
generates gains sometimes and avoid the option 1 that gener-
ates more certain losses. People tend to avoid certain losses
more than uncertain losses. Yet, the framing does not influ-
ence d′obj .
On Domain 2 (Figure 4 (b)), option 1 (µ1 = 5, σ1 = 10) is
optimal with more uncertainty, while option 2 (µ1 = -5, σ1
= 5) is suboptimal with less uncertainty. In this domain, the
loss frame (−4 < xref < 10) leads to an increased subjec-
tive discriminability (d′subj > d
′
obj), whereas the gain frame
(xref < −4) leads to a decreased subjective discriminability
(d′subj < d
′
obj). Note that the gain frame (xref = −10, green
line) would elicit the uncertainty-averse and loss-averse at-
titude (0 < a < 1, λ > 1) tending to prefer option 2 that
generates more certain gains and avoid option 1 that gener-
ates losses sometimes. The loss frame (xref = 5, green line)
would bring out the uncertainty-seeking and loss-averse at-
titude (0 < b < 1, λ > 1) tending to avoid the option 2 that
generates more certain losses and prefer the option 1 that
generates big gains very often.
On Domain with equal uncertainty (Figure 4 (c)), option
1 (µ1 = 5 and σ1 = 5) is optimal, and option 2 (µ1 = -5 and
σ1 = 5) is suboptimal. In this domain, the neutral frame 8
(−5 < xref < 5) leads to an increased subjective discrim-
a < 1, 0 < b < 1 and λ > 1. Yet, other conditions like a > 1
(risk-seeking when faced with likely gains), b > 1 (risk-averse
when faced with likely losses), and/or 0 < λ < 1 (loss-seeking)
can bring different risk attitudes. Subjective value function parame-
ters (shape and reference point) determine risk attitudes and change
subjective discriminability.
7Here we apply rough definitions on frames. On Domain 1 and
Domain 2, when µL and µM indicate the average outcomes of op-
tions with less uncertainty and more uncertainty on each domain,
respectively, the frame is called “gain frame” when xref < (3µL+
µM )/4+ ; and “loss frame” when xref > (3µL+µM )/4+  for
a very small positive or negative number .
8On Domain with equal uncertainty, the frame is called “neutral
frame” when µ2 < xref < µ1; “gain frame” when xref < µ2; and
“loss frame” when xref > µ1.
a = 0.8, b = 0.5, λ = 2.5, xref = 0
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Figure 5: The influence of outcome uncertainties on discrim-
inabilities for each domain. (a): Domain 1 with σ2 = 2σ1.
(b): Domain 2 with σ2 = 0.5σ1
inability (d′subj > d
′
obj) mainly due to loss-averse attitude
(λ > 1, tending to avoid the option 2), whereas the gain
frame (xref < −5) or the loss frame (xref > 5) leads to a
decreased subjective discriminability (d′subj < d
′
obj).
In all simulations (subplots (a),(b) and (c) in Figure 4), a
reference point near the mean of the average outcomes of
two options leads to an increased subjective discriminability
enabling more optimal decisions, regardless of the under-
lying outcome distributions (Domain 1, Domain 2, Domain
with equal uncertainty). 9 Interestingly, when one option is
more uncertain than the other option (as in Domain 1 and
Domain 2), a reference point near the average outcome of
the option with more uncertainty appears to maximize sub-
jective discriminabiliity, allowing the decision maker to be
in gain frame on Domain 1 and loss frame on Domain 2.
The influence of outcome uncertainties on
discriminabilities
Figure 5 illustrates how the outcome uncertainties of two op-
tions (σ1 and σ2) influence discriminabilities when the de-
cision maker employs different subjective value functions.
First, subplot (a) shows simulation results on Domain 1
where µ1 − µ2 = 10 (fixed), σ1 is varying from 1 to 5,
and σ2 = 2σ1. Second, subplot (b) shows simulation results
on Domain 2 where µ1 − µ2 = 10 (fixed), σ1 is varying
from 2 to 10, and σ2 = 0.5σ1. On both domains the sub-
jective discriminability is reliably greater than the objective
discriminability when the levels of outcome uncertainties of
each option are not very large.
Objective and Subjective Decision Rules for
Exploitative Trials
Here we introduce objective and subjective versions of
greedy selection rule using objective outcomes and subjec-
tive values, respectively, but the same can be extended to
other selection rules (e.g., softmax).
Greedy selection based on objective outcomes
After an initial 2nB exploratory trials, the decision maker
employs the greedy selection rule based on objective out-
comes. The mean of sampled outcomes of option k = 1, 2
9In multi-armed bandit tasks, a good reference point is the mean
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Figure 6: The actual frequency rate of selecting the optimal
option in 500 tasks on each domain for strategies (Subj: sub-
jective greedy, Obj: objective greedy, Sampling: probability
matching, VPI: myopic value of perfect information)
Objective Subjective
Optimal β0 0.015 0.06
Mean of loss per trial 0.5450 0.1984
SD of loss per trial 0.5274 0.0974
Table 1: 10-armed bandit experiments: softmax decision
rules based on objective means or subjective means each








k is the num-
ber of sampled outcomes of option k before trial t. If µˆt1 is
greater or lower than µˆt2, the decision maker selects option
1 or 2, respectively. Otherwise, they take a random action.
With this rule, the expected frequency rate of selecting the
optimal option on trial t is Probj(at = 1) = Pr(µˆt1 > µˆ
t
2).
Greedy selection based on subjective values
The mean of sampled subjective values of option k (= 1,











k ) and n
t
k is the number of sampled outcomes of op-
tion k (= 1, 2) before trial t. Also, (σˆtsubj,k)
2 denotes the
variance estimate of subjective values of option k on trial t.
After an initial 2nB exploratory trials, if µˆtsubj,1 is greater
or lower than µˆtsubj,2, the decision maker selects option 1 or
2, respectively. Otherwise, they take a random action. Here
the expected frequency rate of selecting the optimal option




We compare different decision strategies such as subjec-
tive value-based greedy selection, objective outcome-based
greedy selection, action value sampling (probability match-
ing), and myopic value of perfect information (VPI) (Dear-
den, Friedman, and Russell 1998) on Domain 1 and Domain
2. We performed 500 tasks on each domain and rule. Fig-
ure 6 shows the actual frequency rate of selecting the op-
timal option on trial t. In both simulations (Domain 1 and
Domain 2), each strategy had an initial 10 exploratory tri-
als (nB = 5 trials for each option). For action value sam-
pling and myopic VPI, exploratory trials were used to ini-
tialize mean and variance priors for learning in later trials.
For subjective value-based greedy selection, the reference
point on each domain was set to the average outcome of the
more uncertain option (gain framing on Domain 1 and loss
framing on Domain 2) to obtain an increased subjective dis-
criminability as described in the previous section. On each
domain the subjective value-based greedy selection rule ob-
tains the greatest frequency rate of selecting the optimal op-
tion over trials; and thus, the greatest total outcome.
To see if subjective experience-based learning can win
against objective outcome-based learning in more gener-
alized settings, we also performed multi-armed bandit ex-
periments with a different decision rule. Here we com-





l ] based on objective means (q
t
i =




subj,i) each on the 10-armed
bandit domain (K=10 and 500 trials in each task) where
µi − µi+1 = 1 (i = 1, · · · , 9) and σi = 1 (i = 1, · · · , 10).
Also, the reference point for evaluating subjective values dy-
namically changed over trials, setting it to the mean of the
observed top two average outcomes. With β = β0t, we report
the best β0 constant over 500 tasks for each case in Table 1.
The results confirm that the subjective learner beats the ob-
jective learner in terms of mean loss per trial.
Discussion and Conclusion
Iowa and Shiv et al’s experiments were performed in the
face of likely gains (the gain frame). In Figure 4, Iowa task
corresponds to Domain 1, and has greater subjective dis-
criminability in the gain frame than objective discriminabil-
ity. However, Shiv’s task corresponds to Domain 2, and has
lower subjective discriminability in the gain frame than ob-
jective discriminability.
Myopic value of perfect information (VPI) can be viewed
as a sort of exploration bonus provided to outcome uncer-
tainty under the belief that the new information gathered
from the option with more uncertainty would be more likely
to change the future decision strategy than that from other
options with less uncertainty; thus, VPI-based learning ex-
plore the option with more uncertain outcomes more often.
In contrast, some well-known economic models of choice
such as the Markowitz-Tobin (MT) portfolio selection model
make a trade-off between mean (µ) and outcome variance
(σ2) in computing the expected utility of an option (Real
1991): expected utility = µ − aσ2 where a (> 0) is the
risk-aversion coefficient; thus, as the outcome uncertainty
of an option becomes greater, choice preference for that op-
tion becomes lower. Yet, subjective learning shows different
uncertainty attitudes relying on the frame chosen by the de-
cision maker (reference point) and the shape of subjective
value function parameters. With the representative function
shape in Figure 2, subjective learning tends to avoid the op-
tion with more uncertain outcomes in the gain frame but pre-
fer such an option in the loss frame.
Our contribution functions in a way that can be used com-
putationally by AI researchers who want their systems to ex-
hibit more of the behaviors that people exhibit.
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